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ABSTRACT
The problem of online privacy is often reduced to individual
decisions to hide or reveal personal information in online so-
cial networks (OSNs). However, with the increasing use of
OSNs, it becomes more important to understand the role of
the social network in disclosing personal information that a
user has not revealed voluntarily: How much of our private
information do our friends disclose about us, and how much
of our privacy is lost simply because of online social inter-
action? Without strong technical effort, an OSN may be
able to exploit the assortativity of human private features,
this way constructing shadow profiles with information that
users chose not to share. Furthermore, because many users
share their phone and email contact lists, this allows an OSN
to create full shadow profiles for people who do not even have
an account for this OSN.
We empirically test the feasibility of constructing shadow
profiles of sexual orientation for users and non-users, using
data from more than 3 Million accounts of a single OSN.
We quantify a lower bound for the predictive power derived
from the social network of a user, to demonstrate how the
predictability of sexual orientation increases with the size
of this network and the tendency to share personal informa-
tion. This allows us to define a privacy leak factor that links
individual privacy loss with the decision of other individu-
als to disclose information. Our statistical analysis reveals
that some individuals are at a higher risk of privacy loss,
as prediction accuracy increases for users with a larger and
more homogeneous first- and second-order neighborhood of
their social network. While we do not provide evidence that
shadow profiles exist at all, our results show that disclos-
ing of private information is not restricted to an individual
choice, but becomes a collective decision that has implica-
tions for policy and privacy regulation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Our society is increasingly grounded on information and
communication technologies, in which protecting one’s pri-
vacy might not be an individual choice [12]. In online social
networks (OSNs), the characteristics of each user is deter-
mined primarily by its connections, rather than by its in-
trinsic properties. Hence, from an individual’s perspective,
isolation is often not a desirable option [42]. To that end,
the issue of protecting one’s privacy within the OSN relates
largely to the community the individual is embedded in, and
how it is handled, if at all, by the community at large.
Although the existence of mass surveillance and the immi-
nent threats it poses are known by many, studies in a number
of fields show that people do little to protect their privacy
against surveillance [42]. In an OSN, users are often incen-
tivised to share personal data, e.g. by offering some sort of
benefit or personalization as a service (e.g. recommender
systems). But incentives also arise from social influences,
e.g. from social surveillance of peers to receive attention
and to reinforce existing relationships [33]. When an OSN
provider has access to the contacts of users, it gains stronger
predictive power. Together with the content willingly pro-
duced by users, there are ways to extract probabilistic pro-
files of other users, even about persons who did not have an
account in the given OSN [9].
On the aggregated level, this leads to an imbalance be-
tween the knowledge that a single user has about the OSN
provider and the knowledge that the provider has, or is able
to deduce, about individual users and even about persons
that are not users. There is no way of knowing how the
information provided by an everyday user to the OSN can
be utilized, and there are no clear policies about this either.
The usage often stretches from personalization to social dis-
crimination, without the user’s knowledge [31]. A Facebook
bug revealed in 2013 is an appropriate example for one of the
many ways the information provided by users may be uti-
lized. According to the reported bug, Facebook attempted
to obtain users’ off-site email addresses and phone numbers,
gathered from the contact lists shared by other users. It
appeared that the covertly collected information was then
being stored in each Facebook user’s invisible Shadow Pro-
file that is somehow attached to accounts [1]. Digital trends
[3] defines a Facebook Shadow Profile as ”a file that Face-
book keeps on you containing data it pulls up from looking
at the information that a user’s friends voluntarily provide.
You’re not supposed to see it, or even know it exists.” Face-
book reacted to the incident to fix the leak as soon as possi-
ble. However, what has remained not fixed until now is their
policy. In a set of interviews, Facebook officials claimed that
obtaining third party user data on individuals in this manner
was not a privacy breach since the data has been submitted
voluntarily by members of Facebook, which make the data
a property of Facebook [2]. This argument is backed up by
the following statement in Facebook Terms of Service:
We receive information about you from your friends and
others, such as when they upload your contact information,
post a photo of you, tag you in a photo or status update, or
at a location, or add you to a group. When people use
Facebook, they may store and share information about you
and others that they have, such as when they upload and
manage their invites and contacts [4].
Facebook for Mobile alone has over one billion users that
agreed to their terms of service, which allows the applica-
tion to ”read data about your contacts stored on your phone,
including the frequency with which you’ve called, emailed, or
communicated in other ways with specific individuals”. It is
not difficult to imagine the massive amount of ongoing data
acquisition based on such intact privacy policies. Therefore,
it becomes an imminent question to what extent can an OSN
be turned into a tool that acquires data to profile the whole
society, just because some individuals have become mem-
bers of that OSN. Our main contribution to this discussion
is to demonstrate to what extent the information of an OSN
provider about its users can be used to quantify knowledge
about the individuals of our society, at large. We use an em-
pirical dataset from Friendster, a large online social net-
working site that preceded Facebook. This dataset, which
is publicly accessible in the Internet Archive1, allowed us
to evaluate the power that Friendster had to create shadow
profiles.
Our aim is not to provide new tools or algorithms to im-
prove the accuracy of the knowledge that an OSN provider
can possess. Instead, we aim to apply state of the art statis-
tical analyses and machine learning techniques to quantify
the extent to which individual privacy is leaked by the ac-
tivity of others in an OSN, and to empirically test how the
individual decision to reveal information turns into a col-
lective phenomenon to disclose privacy. In our analysis, we
study two interrelated problems. First we explore the Par-
tial Shadow Profile problem, in which an OSN infers pri-
vate information that its users chose not to share. Second,
we address the Full Shadow Profile problem, in which an
OSN provider discovers private information about individu-
als who do not even have an account there, solely based on
personal information and contact lists shared by its actual
users.
In this work, we focus on sexual orientation as a relevant
and sensitive private information the disclosure of which
1https://archive.org/details/archive-team-friendster
should be in control of the users. The combination of gender
and sexual orientation creates a set of classes that appear
with inhomogeneous frequencies, which is often the case in
real-life prediction problems of different domains (e.g. polit-
ical affiliation). For each user, we construct a simple social
context based on frequency measures on the neighborhood
at increasing distances. We quantify privacy leak factors for
different sexual orientation groups and analyze how they are
affected by two main factors, the network size and the disclo-
sure parameter, i.e. the ratio of users sharing their contact
lists and/or private information with the OSN. We further
analyze how the coefficients of larger (i.e. majority) and
smaller (i.e. minority) sexual orientation groups compare
with respect to these two factors.
2. RELATED WORK
Understanding privacy in OSNs starts with the individual
motivation to share personal information and its associated
risk of sharing this information with undesired contacts [6,
24]. Most OSNs include highly customizable modules to con-
trol privacy settings, which can lead to higher efforts and un-
certainty how to use the site [29], or to distancing from those
users that have a lower awareness of possible data leakage
[32, 26, 10]. Recent technologies promise to alleviate user
privacy concerns. For example, distributed recommender
systems can put a limit to privacy disclosure [21], deploy-
ment of OSNs in the cloud can avoid the centralization of
user data [44, 46], techniques for picture encryption [43] and
content anonymization [38] can prevent undesired access to
private content.
Private information about users can be a source of wealth,
e.g. by significantly increasing the revenue of personalized
advertisement [19]. This creates incentives for OSNs to share
private user information with third parties, from which the
user does not necessarily benefit. A possible solution for this
dilemma is to create monetization schemes that allow users
to set up the price they request for companies to access their
private information [41], effectively creating privacy butlers
that automatically control privacy [45, 27]. This approach
can be criticized for its ethics about the value of privacy,
asking if market dynamics would push less wealthy individ-
uals to have no privacy [36]. Additionally, the monetization
of privacy relies on systems that would allow an individual
to have full access control of its privacy, which is hardly
realistic.
Even with full individual control, the possibility of third-
parties to infer private attributes still exists [35]. The dis-
covery of unknown/hidden parts of a network based on its
visible properties is a well studied problem, in particular
with respect to link prediction [15, 5, 28]. Such hidden links
have been shown to be predictable by geographic coinci-
dences [14], using geotagged photo data from Flickr. The
method introduced in [14] utilizes the number and proxim-
ity in time and space of co-occurences among pairs of indi-
viduals to infer the likelihood of a social tie between them.
The link prediction problem has also been applied to predict
links between non-users of Facebook [20], given only the link
information towards non-members from the known network.
Additionally, the network completion problem aims to infer
both missing links and nodes, where it has been shown that
the missing part of the network can be inferred based only
on the connectivity patterns of the observed part [5].
Previous studies of user privacy have focused on sensitive
attribute inference problems, where user private attributes
are detected based on a mix of public profiles in the net-
work, friendship links and group membership information of
private users [47]. Specifically, within the friendship identi-
fication and inference attack [23], a user might aim to infer
private attributes of another user. Given that the attacker
and the target are direct or 2-distant neighbors, the suc-
cess of such attacks depends on network topological prop-
erties, such as the position of the attacker in the network.
Furthermore, iterative algorithms can effectively label nodes
by propagating information to their neighborhoods [18]. A
wide variety of models have aimed at predicting different
private features, such as gender, age, political orientation
[39], home location [37], and academic profiles [34]. In the
context of sexual and romantic relationships, two previous
works are especially relevant. First, the “gaydar” experi-
ment [22] showed that homosexual male users can be de-
tected based on the amount of friends of the same type they
had on Facebook. Second, a recent article [7] proposes a
new measure of dispersion and applies it to a large Face-
book dataset in order to predict which of a user’s friends is
their romantic partner.
In this article, we evaluate the accuracy of partial and
full shadow profiles for the sexual orientation of users and
non-users of the Friendster social network. Our analysis
builds on the sequence of users joining Friendster to evalu-
ate predictions over individuals without a user account in a
similar manner as done in [20] where the links between non-
users are inferred. Knowing in which sequence the users
joined Friendster has freed us from having to utilize a net-
work growth model in our analysis. Furthermore, we pay
special attention to the ratios of friends belonging to each
orientation in the neighborhood of users at a given time in
the growth of the network. Our results should be compared
with previous work on sexual orientation of users in smaller
datasets [22]. To our knowledge, our work is the first to ad-
dress the possibility of creating full shadow profiles for the
sexual orientation of non-users from a large scale OSN.
3. DATA DESCRIPTION
Before its social networking functionalities were discon-
tinued, Friendster was crawled by the Internet Archive,
leaving a snapshot of all the publicly available information
at that moment. Our previous analysis of the connectivity
patterns of the network [16] reveals that the first 20 Million
users of Friendster were largely located in the US, before
the OSN spread to other countries. The growth of Friend-
ster in the US stopped because of the competition with
MySpace and Facebook [40]. This allows us to analyze these
initial 20 Million users as a subset of US users of the OSN.
The amount of information about each user available in
the Friendster dataset depends on the privacy settings of
the user. Most of them allowed their friendship lists to be
publicly available, and some of them also let other users
to see private features explicitly given by the user, such as
age and gender. Within the subset we considered, 3,431,335
users had public profiles which were captured by the crawl,
including the personal information explained in Table 1.
This subset contains a total of 11,074,009 undirected friend-
ship links among these public profiles only, resulting in an
average degree of 3.23.
Feature Description
User ID integer
Name string
Birth date date
Gender Male, Female, or Unspecified
Interests∗ Friends, Activity Partners, Just looking
around, Fans, Dating Women, Relationship
with Women, Dating Men, Relationship with
Men, Dating Men and Women, Relationship
with Men and Women
Relationship
status
Single, Married, In a Relationship, Domestic
Partners, It’s Complicated
Table 1: Friendster public profile features. The in-
terests feature contains one or more of its possible
values.
In addition, each user has an id number that indicates the
order in which the user joined the social network, allowing us
to construct time-dependent vectors of feature distributions
in user neighborhoods, as described in the following section.
The network in Figure 1 displays the Friendster net-
work among a randomly selected 10% of the users with pub-
lic profiles, where node colors represent the sexual orien-
tation class, and the colored edges represent assortativity
where two endpoints share the same sexual orientation class.
About 30% of all the edges are assortative in this represen-
tative network, which suggests that it is common to form
links based on sexual orientation.
Figure 1: The network for a subset of Friendster
users. The red edges represent assortativity, where
the endpoint nodes are in the same sexual orienta-
tion class. The node colors correspond to the sexual
orientation class.
4. METHODS
Gender M F Class Label % users
Female No No Female without interest FF 28.2
Male No No Male without interest FM 26.4
Female Yes No Heterosexual female HeF 9.3
Male Yes No Homosexual male HoM 1.9
Female No Yes Homosexual female HoF 1.0
Male No Yes Heterosexual male HeM 19.9
Female Yes Yes Bisexual female BiF 6.8
Male Yes Yes Bisexual male BiM 6.5
Table 2: User orientation classification. An ”inter-
ested in” relationship may stand for interested in
dating or having a relationship.
Being aware that sexual orientation and gender can be
defined in a variety of ways [8], we use the simplest classi-
fication available in our data: gender as birth sex (male or
female) and sexual orientation simplified to the set of possi-
ble combinations of interest towards the two genders. This
way, we combine gender with the explicit romantic interest
in other genders, as specified by Dating and Relationship
interests towards different genders introduced in Table 1.
Each user can be assigned to one of the eight classes with re-
spect to their sexual orientations, which are described in Ta-
ble 2. Additional features of sexual orientation can capture
other activities, group identities, or political standpoints,
and other features that cannot be empirical measured in
our dataset.
Features Description
Profile Age, gender, relationship status, Sexual
orientation
nk Number of users at distance k
ak Average age of friends at distance k
gk Gender counts at distance k
rk Relationship counts at distance k
ik Romantic interest counts at distance k
xk Sexual orientation counts at distance k
xw Weighted frequency of friends of each sex-
ual orientation
Table 3: Features of the user vector. Neighborhood
frequencies are computed for distances 1, 2, and 3,
for each possible value of the profile features.
For each user in the dataset, we built a feature vector in-
cluding their profile information, and different metrics of the
distribution of features in their neighborhood at distances
up to 3. For each distance k, we calculated the amount of
users at that exact distance (nk), and within those users,
we counted the amounts of users with each possible value
of gender, relationship status, romantic interest, and sexual
orientation. To measure age in the neighborhood, we com-
puted the average age of the users at distance k (ak). Since
previous research suggests that the most indicative factor
is the sexual orientation of the first neighbors of the user
[22], we computed an additional weighted count of friends
of each sexual orientation, weighting each link by the amount
of common friends that the two users have. The features of
this vector are summarized in Table 3.
5. PARTIAL SHADOW PROFILES
Our first step was to explore the partial shadow profiles
problem. We define partial shadow profiles as enhanced data
of an OSN provider about its users, covering personal infor-
mation these users did not initially agree to share. We test
the OSN provider’s ability to construct partial shadow pro-
files over the set of users that have initially disclosed their
romantic interest towards at least one gender, leaving out
users of the classes FF and FM. This leaves us with 1,027,400
users and six classes, with feature vectors built over the net-
work including all 3.3 Million users to reach neighborhoods
at larger distances.
We arrange the data of these users as follows: We choose
a partial disclosure parameter R ∈ {x/10 : x ∈ N, x <
10}, defined as the probability that a user has shared sexual
interest information with the social network. For a given
R, we include users in the training set with probability R,
and leave them for the test set with probability 1−R. The
training set contains those users whose sexual orientation
class are known, and the test set contains those users whose
class or other user features (e.g. gender and age) are hidden.
This reproduces the problem setup that the OSN provider
faces when constructing partial profiles: a set of its users
have disclosed their orientation, but others chose not to.
We preserve the friendship links of all users, including those
in the test set and build the user vector for the training set
of users, using all the links and only the user features within
the training set, since the user features of the test set of
users are hidden. We use this vector to train a Random
Forest Classifier, and use the resulting classifier to predict
the sexual orientation of users in the test set. Since both the
training and the test cases are randomly chosen, we repeat
this 10 times for each R.
Through these 10 repetitions, we aim at understanding
the dependence between the tendency to share personal in-
formation of the users of an OSN, and the predictability of
the sexual orientation of those users who chose not to share
that information. In particular we want to understand under
which conditions this prediction would outperform a random
estimator and by what factor.
5.1 Prediction Results
For each value of R and random samplings of training and
test users, we computed the Precision and Recall values for
each of the six sexual orientation classes. Figure 2 shows the
mean values over the 10 runs of each value of R.
We observe that for all classes, Recall can reach values
much higher than the base rate, which is equivalent to the
percentage of users that belong to each class. This holds for
low values of R for all classes but homosexual females and
bisexual males, which require R > 0.3 to have a precision
above the base rate. For the case of homosexual females,
which constitutes 2% of all users, the Precision increases up
to 60% but the Recall values increase marginally between
2% and 4%, showing that some homosexual females can be
detected with high Precision, but the vast majority of them
cannot be predicted by the Random Forest Classifier. The
most striking results are for homosexual males, where both
Precision and Recall are several times above the base rate,
and for the majority classes of heterosexual males and fe-
males, which also show large values of Precision and Recall.
Precision values alone indicate that the accuracy of pre-
dictions increases significantly with higher values of R. To
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Figure 2: Recall and Precision (%) for each class ver-
sus R for the partial shadow profile problem. The
blue lines and the left y-axis show the recall values,
whereas the red lines and the right y-axis show the
precision values as R, the partial disclosure param-
eter, grows. The dashed black line shows the base
rate, the percentage of users for each class within
the whole data set.
empirically test the relationship between prediction results
and the partial disclosure parameter, we computed Cohen’s
Kappa Coefficient [13] for each class and classification run:
κ =
Pr(a)− Pr(e)
1− Pr(e)
(1)
where Pr(a) is the relative observed agreement between clas-
sification and test data, and Pr(e) is the hypothetical proba-
bility of chance agreement, using the observed data to calcu-
late the probabilities of each observer randomly saying each
category.
If the raters are in complete agreement then κ = 1. If
there is no agreement among the raters other than what
would be expected by chance (as defined by Pr(e)), κ = 0.
Cohen’s Kappa κ captures a combination of Precision and
Recall similar to the F1 value, but includes the compari-
son to the baseline of a random classifier in its calculation.
Thus, the performance of a random classifier would tend to-
wards κ = 0, while the value of F1 would depend on the
distribution of classes in the dataset.
Since Kappa’s coefficient is independent of class size and
thus is resilient to biases introduced by differing class sizes,
we aggregate the performance of the classifier for individual
classes into a single average κ. Figure 3 displays the average
Cohen’s Kappa coefficient over all classes.
We observe that as the partial disclosure parameter R
grows, an OSN provider would be able to predict, with
higher accuracy, the sexual orientation of those users that
did not share it. We statistically test this observation through
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Figure 3: Cohen’s Kappa coefficient versus R for the
partial shadow profile problem.
a privacy leak factor for each user class, computed as the
weight of R in a linear regressor with an intercept and κ as
dependent variable. Table 4 shows the statistical results for
each of the six fits, as well as the fit for the privacy leak
factor computed for all classes on the average κ.
Class Class % priv. leak. factor p-value
HeM 47 0.02 2.9× 10−7
HeF 23 0.04 2.1× 10−3
BiM 9 0.09 4.9× 10−4
BiF 16 0.06 5.2× 10−2
HoM 4 0.24 7.1× 10−6
HoF 2 0.02 8.6× 10−3
κ - 0.12 1.1× 10−3
Table 4: privacy leak factors for each class and av-
erage κ in the partial shadow profiles problem. All
estimates are below the 0.01 significance level, with
the exception of BiF.
This statistical analysis demonstrates that all classes have
a significant and positive privacy leak factors, with the ex-
ception of bisexual females, for which the p-value was above
0.01. The size estimates of the privacy leak factor differ
across classes, having relatively low values for heterosexual
male and female, and for the homosexual female class. The
largest values are present for the homosexual and bisexual
male classes. Homosexual males have low predictability un-
der R = 0.1, since they constitute about 4% of all users, but
the privacy leak factor is much higher than for other classes,
being estimated as 0.24, 12 times larger than for the largest
class of heterosexual males. This suggests that homosexual
male users that do not disclose their sexual orientation are
at a larger risk of privacy leakage if the tendency of other
users to share their sexual orientation becomes stronger.
Finally, the standard errors for the average κ, and the
Precision and Recall of individual classes reveal that, across
the 10 runs for each R, the prediction accuracy does not
vary much for a given R, especially for higher values of R.
This suggests that the prediction accuracy does not rely on
which users of the OSN have revealed their sexual orienta-
tion, given that large enough (R ≃ 0.3) percentage of the
population share personal information.
6. FULL SHADOW PROFILES
Full shadow profiles are the profiles that an OSN provider
can generate about individuals that do not have an account
for this OSN. The idea is, when a user shares its contact list
with the OSN, the provider can find out which email ad-
dresses do not have an associated account and can generate
a full shadow profile for these non-users. If those non-users
appear in many contact lists of OSN users, data mining tech-
niques can be used to infer the home location, age, gender,
etc, of the non-users.
For the Full Shadow Profiles problem, we arrange our data
as follows: We select a parameter a ∈ {x/10 : x ∈ N, x <
10}, where each a divides the whole user data of N users
into two sets:
– Inside user set, which is of size a×N users
– Outside user set, which is of size (1− a) ×N users
In Figure 4, the Inside user set is represented by the combi-
nation of the black and gray nodes, and is the set of members
of the OSN at time t. The Outside user set is represented by
the combination of red and white nodes, which are the set
of users that are not part of the network at time t, hereafter
denoted as non-users.
Furthermore, we introduce a disclosure parameter ρ ∈
{0.5, 0.7, 0.9} which is the fraction of users in the Inside
user set that shared all of their contacts with Friendster.
For Facebook, given the fact that every user of the Facebook
for Mobile initially has to agree that Facebook can access
their contact list, ρ would be closer to 1.0.
Figure 4: Schema of the full shadow profile construction
problem.
Given a combination of a and ρ, we measure: a) To what
degree is the OSN provider able to find out about the sexual
orientation of the non-users; b) How much is the social net-
work confident about its findings about the non-users, by
measuring how much it can predict about its actual user
base, i.e. Inside. To that end, we pursue the following
method in three steps:
1. We build a user vector for each user in the Inside user
set as described in Section 3 2, discarding all their links
to the non-users. We then use this user vector to build
a Random Forest classifier [11] over the user class of
sexual orientation (hereby referred to as RFa ).
2. For each user in the Inside user set, we flip a biased
coin where the outcome is heads with probability ρ and
for those users that got tails, we discard all their links
to the non-users. Using the remaining links, we build
the user vector of the non-users who have at least one
link to Inside. This user vector represents the vector
that the social network can construct for the non-users,
using only the contacts of its users that shared their
contact lists.
3. We use RFa to predict the sexual orientation of the
non-users.
While building the feature vectors for non-users in step 2,
we discard all user attributes (relationship status, age and
gender) from the feature vector, and keep only neighbor-
hood information for each user. The reason we discard user
attributes is to represent the real life situation where the so-
cial network knows nothing at all about the non-users at t.
Since RFa will be used to classfy the resulting vector, RFa
must also be built using the same features available in for
the non-users. Therefore, we discard all user attributes also
from the user feature vector in step 1.
Step 1 is run once for each a where we acquire a corre-
sponding RFa Step 2 and 3 are repeated 10 times for each
(a, ρ) pair, such that for each run, a different ρ fraction of
users share their contact lists, and hence a different set of
links are preserved to the non-users.
6.1 Prediction Results
In the full shadow profiles problem, non-users are subject
of losing privacy as other individuals join the OSN, poten-
tially revealing their contacts. We evaluate the performance
of the RFa classifier over the set of non-users, for increasing
values of a, to test if prediction accuracy correlates with the
size of the OSN. Since these results are subject to increase
with the disclosure parameter ρ, we repeat the analysis for
three different values of ρ. We measured precision and recall
over the complete set of non-users, and report their mean
values over 10 resamples in Figure 5.
For all classes, there is an increasing trend in recall values
with a, as well as with ρ. ρ plays a more significant role for
recall than for precision. This is because as ρ grows, feature
vectors for more non-users can be constructed, leaving out
less and less non-users from the predictions, which impacts
recall over all non-users. Larger values of a also contribute
to precision in most of the cases, but this increase seems
negligible compared to the distance between precision and
base rate of each class. To further understand these trends,
we computed Cohen’s Kappa for all classes over each evalua-
tion. The average values of κ versus a are shown in Figure 6,
showing that the predictive power of the classifier increases
with a and slightly increases with ρ.
To statistically test for the presence of an increase of pre-
diction quality with a, we calculated privacy leak factors for
2For the full shadow profile analysis, we did not use 3-order
neighborhood information due to the large number of simu-
lations needed and computational limitations that were in-
troduced
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Figure 5: Precision and recall for each class in the full shadow profiles problem, for ρ = 0.5 (red), ρ = 0.7
(blue), and ρ = 0.9 (green). The base rate of each class is given by the dashed black line.
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Figure 6: Cohen’s Kappa in full shadow profiles for
all classes versus a, for ρ = 0.5 (red), ρ = 0.7 (blue),
and ρ = 0.9 (green).
the full shadow profiles problem. In contrast with the par-
tial shadow profiles problem, where we linked the decision
of users to disclose their personal information, in the full
shadow profiles problem we are interested in knowing how
the decision of some users to join the OSN can influence the
privacy of non-users. Thus, we compute privacy leak factor
as the regression weight of a in the κ of the classifier for
different values of ρ. As shown in Table 5, the privacy leak
factor is positive and significant for the three values of ρ,
suggesting that an overall privacy loss for non-users as the
OSN grows.
The privacy leak factor for full shadow profiles is not ho-
mogeneous for all sexual orientations. Table 6 shows the
privacy leak factors, which are positive and significant for
all classes but homosexual female. The values of the pri-
vacy leak factor do not greatly differ for the three values
of ρ, suggesting that the main driving factor of privacy loss
of non-users is network growth. Comparing across classes,
ρ privacy leak factor (all classes) p-value
0.5 0.12 0.007
0.7 0.13 0.002
0.9 0.16 0.002
Table 5: Privacy leak factor in full shadow profiles,
calculated over κ for all classes.
the sexual orientation with the strongest privacy leak factor
is bisexual females, which had the least significant counter-
part for partial shadow profiles, as shown in Table 4. This
suggests that bisexual females can be detected with higher
accuracy when other users join the OSN, rather than by
disclosure of private attributes within the OSN.
ρ Class priv.leak f. p-value Class priv.leak f. p-value
0.5 0.21 0.015 0.23 0.021
0.7 HeM 0.18 0.035 HeF 0.15 0.059
0.9 0.21 0.030 0.15 0.051
0.5 0.17 0.00021 0.35 0.0012
0.7 BiM 0.19 0.0011 BiF 0.32 0.0024
0.9 0.21 0.0037 0.30 0.0055
0.5 0.11 0.029 0.0012 0.71
0.7 HoM 0.087 0.048 HoF 0.0036 0.57
0.9 0.097 0.046 0.0037 0.61
Table 6: Privacy leak factor in full shadow profiles
for each class.
6.2 Analyzing Prediction Results
We analyzed the properties that correctly predicted non-
users have in common, in order to shed light to other factors
that may have played a role in predictions. Figure 7 shows
the distribution of the first order neighborhood size in the
Inside for all non-users at a = 0.6 and ρ = 0.9, and the
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Figure 7: Bottom left: First order neighborhood
size distribution where the sizes are the number
of friends in the known part of the network who
shared their contact lists. Top left: True Positive
rate (TPR) for different first order neighborhood
sizes where TPR is given by the ratio of number
of correctly predicted users to the number of users
that fall into each neighborhood size range. Bot-
tom right: Second order neighborhood size distri-
bution. Top right: TPR for different second order
neighborhood sizes. All figures are derived from 10
simulations where a = 0.6 and ρ = 0.9.
corresponding true positive rate (TPR) for each neighbor-
hood size range, calculated as the ratio of correctly classified
users over all classified users. Non-users with at least one
friend in the Inside are more likely to be predicted correctly
(TPR = 0.52). In addition, the TPR increases with neigh-
borhood size. At first sight, this would mean that one friend
in the Inside set gives the OSN provider enough power to
accurately profile a non-user. But looking at Figure 7 (right
column), which shows the TPR distribution for different sec-
ond order neighborhood sizes of non-users, we observe a new
dependence: Although the second order neighborhood size
is more heterogeneous, the TPR increases significantly for
larger sizes. Therefore, from a non-user’s perspective, not
only the amount of friends in the OSN is a critical factor,
but how well connected those friends are.
We explored the assortativity of sexual orientation be-
tween users and non-users, and how this can increase pre-
diction accuracy. As an example, we look at homosexual
male users, which is one of the smallest classes. Figure 8
displays the distribution of homosexual male user ratios in
the first order neighborhood of non-users of the same orien-
tation, and the corresponding TPR for each ratio of assorta-
tive links. It is more likely that homosexual male non-users
will be classified correctly as the ratio of links of the same
kind increases in their first order neighborhood, suggesting
that assortativity plays a significant role in privacy leakage.
An ratio of homosexual male friends of 0.1 is quite common,
and displays no significant affect on TPR (TPR = 0.09),
although it is still larger than the base rate. For a ratio
of homosexual male friends between 0.2 and 0.5, there is a
clear increase in the TPR.
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Figure 8: (bottom left) Distribution of HoM user
ratios in the first order neighborhood of HoM non-
users. (top left) TPR for HoM non-users in each
HoM ratio range, where TPR is given by the ratio
of number of correctly predicted HoM non-users to
all HoM non-users. (bottom right) Distribution of
HoM user ratios in the second order neighborhood
of HoM non-users. (top right) TPR for HoM non-
users in each second order HoM ratio range. All
figures are derived from 10 simulations where a = 0.6
and ρ = 0.9.
Noise is present between 0.5 and 0.6, due to the fact that
there are only very few non-users that fall in these categories.
Figure 8 suggests that the ratios of homosexual male friends
in the second order neighborhoods of non-users also correlate
with the respective TPR values, suggesting that higher order
assortative ties also influence privacy leakage.
These figures help us understand further what kind of dy-
namics contribute to privacy leakage in an OSN. The privacy
leakage seems to be influenced by the size of the first order
neighborhood, how many highly connected users exist within
the first order neighborhood, and the assortativity across
the first and second order neighborhoods with respect to
the user’s sexual orientation. The cross-dependence among
these three factors seem to result in a large amount of pri-
vacy leakage. In this section we have looked at only a few of
the possible factors and analyzed assortative relationships of
only one sexual orientation class. The analysis can certainly
be extended by looking into network features of known and
unknown users and into different different classes.
7. DISCUSSION
The privacy leak factor is not homogeneous for all sexual
orientations. We showed that the privacy leak factors for
large and small groups respond differently to changing net-
work size and disclosure behavior. For example, the amount
by which precision and recall digress away from their respec-
tive base rates for HoM individuals is much larger than and
HeM individuals. Often, it is more risky for smaller groups
to be compromised within the society, whereas larger groups
are often not concerned by this risk. This is mostly due to
peer pressure or to the fact that minority rights are legally
not represented.
There are multiple factors that put individuals under pri-
vacy risk. We have shown that network size and disclosure
parameter influence privacy risk for non-users. We have also
suggested that this risk varies depending on how connected
a non-user is to the network, and the nature of their con-
nection (i.e. the homophilic nature of connections).
The simulations are representative of a realistic network
growth scenario and disclosure behavior. Our simulations
are representative of a realistic network growth since we used
Friendster user IDs, which are sequential with respect to
the member’s joining time, thus freeing our analysis to con-
sult different growth models. Furthermore, the choice for
the range of disclosure parameter, ρ ∈ [0.5, 0.7, 0.9], corre-
sponds to a realistic scenario for the fraction of members
sharing their contact lists. ρ = 0.9 is closer to reality as
most people share their contact lists (either voluntarily or
due to the accepted terms of use) when they subscribe to an
online social network, as reports about Facebook reveal. Fi-
nally, since we have made 10 runs for each a and ρ pair, and
since standard errors are quite marginal, we can conclude
that the findings are rather representative of the conditions
a and ρ.
Since the data of the first 20 Million Friendster users
have been downloaded from the Internet Archive, the com-
pleteness of the dataset can only be guaranteed based on
what the Internet Archive offers. Furthermore, we are
bounded by about 3.3 Million of these users that disclosed
any sort of sexual orientation, which results in a sparser
network than that of all 20 Million users. Although the
resulting network and user data is much bigger than the
datasets that have been used in other works, a more com-
prehensive study can take into account all 20 Million profiles
and study the 3.3Mil using all their links in the 20 Million.
This would mean analyzing some 70 Million edges. How-
ever, given the number of user vectors computed for full
shadow profiles alone where a user vector for the non-users
is computed 10 times for each (a, ρ) pair, resulting in 180
user vectors; and given the number of links that had to be
traversed for computing each vector and the computational
limitations introduced thereof, we believe that our results
do provide a comprehensive analysis of privacy leakage. We
have also not provided further analysis of factors that may
play a role in prediction accuracy other than the ones dis-
cussed in Section 6.2. A more comprehensive analysis at
this stage can answer the question which neighborhoods in
larger distances still play a significant role in putting users
under privacy leakage risk.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We presented an analysis of the social component of pri-
vacy, and how the decisions of some users to disclose private
information impacts the chances of other users to maintain
their privacy. This provides an indirect coupling between
seemingly unrelated user decisions, as it was also observed in
other online communities where the decision of some users to
become incative influences other the activity of other users
[16]. Users in isolation face lower risks of losing privacy than
when they interact with each other. The same way as social
interaction leads to the emergence of conventions [25], it can
also undermine the quality of collective decisions [30], posing
the question of how much private information a user loses
just for interacting with others. Our work focused on sex-
ual orientation, resonating within works on gender-aligned
interaction in online communities [17]. But it keeps open to
study privacy leakage in other kinds of private information,
such as age or marital status.
We showed that the privacy leak factors for large and
small groups respond differently to changing network size
and disclosure behavior. For example, privacy leak factors
are higher for homosexual males than for heterosexual males
in the partial shadow profiles problem, showing that the for-
mer group loses more privacy as other users share their sex-
ual orientation with the OSN provider. We have shown that
network size and disclosure parameter influence privacy risk
for non-users in the full shadow profiles problem, and that
this risk varies depending on how connected a non-user is to
the network, and the assortative nature of their connections.
This poses a simple conclusion: not having an account in an
OSN does not guarantee a higher level of privacy, as long as
one has enough friends who already are in the OSN.
In an interlinked community, an individual’s privacy is a
complex property, where it is in constant mutual relation-
ship with the systemic properties and behavioral patterns of
the community at large. We provided quantitative insights
into the dependence of an individual’s privacy to their re-
spective community, and how far an OSN provider can uti-
lize this dependency to create shadow profiles. Our work
does not improve the methods to create shadow profiles; we
limited ourselves to the application of existing methods to
underline an already existing risk. We showed that, as the
network grows and its members share their contact lists with
the provider, the risk of privacy leakage increases. Given the
fact that this dependency is present under generalized social
interaction, we should consider privacy as a collective con-
cept, where individual privacy policies are not sufficient to
control private information.
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